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Laboratory experiments are a widely used methodology for advancing causal knowledge in 
the physical and life sciences. With the exception of psychology, the adoption of laboratory 
experiments has been much slower in the social sciences, although during the last two 
decades, the use of lab experiments has accelerated. Nonetheless, there remains 
considerable resistance among social scientists who argue that lab experiments lack 
“realism” and “generalizability”. In this article we discuss the advantages and limitations of 
laboratory social science experiments by comparing them to research based on non-
experimental data and to field experiments. We argue that many recent objections against 
lab experiments are misguided and that even more lab experiments should be conducted. 
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The social sciences have generally been less willing to use laboratory experiments than the 
natural sciences, and empirical social science has traditionally been considered as largely 
non-experimental, that is, based on observations collected in naturally occurring situations. 
The first lab experiments in economics were not conducted until the late 1940s. Fewer than 
10 experimental papers per year were published before 1965, and about 30 per year by 1975 
(1, 2). Starting from this low level, experimentation in economics greatly increased in the 
mid 1980s. In three well-known economics journals—the American Economic Review, 
Econometrica and the Quarterly Journal of Economics—the fraction of laboratory 
experimental papers in relation to all published papers was between 0.84 percent and 1.58 
percent in the 1980s, between 3.06 percent and 3.32 percent in the 1990s and between 3.8 
percent and 4.15 percent between 2000 and 2008 (authors’ calculations). The percentages 
were much higher in more specialized economics journals. The first specialty journal, 
Experimental Economics, was founded in 1998. A similar increase in lab experiments has 
taken place in other social sciences as well, e.g., in political science (3). 
Many social scientists are still reluctant to rely on laboratory evidence. Common 
objections are that student subject pools are unrepresentative and that sample sizes are small. 
There is also a widespread view that the lab produces “unrealistic” data, which lacks 
relevance for understanding the “real world”. This notion is based on an implicit hierarchy in 
terms of generating relevant data, with field data being superior to lab data. We argue that 
this view, despite its intuitive appeal, is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of 
evidence in science and of the kind of data collected in the lab. We also argue that many of 
the objections against evidence from the lab suggest the wisdom of conducting more lab 
experiments, not fewer. While most of our examples and topics are taken from economics, 
the methodological points we discuss can be applied to all social sciences. 
 
 
The lab provides controlled variation 
Controlled variation is the foundation of empirical scientific knowledge.  The laboratory 
allows tight control of decision environments. As an illustration, consider a simple 
experiment, the gift exchange game, which tests the theory that employment relationships are 
governed by a gift exchange, i.e., that workers reciprocate “fair” wages with high effort. A 
positive relationship between wages and effort is the central assumption of efficiency wage 
theories that have important implications for the functioning of labor markets and that can 
explain rigid wages and involuntary unemployment (4). Testing this class of theories with 
field data is notoriously difficult. For example, in firms, worker effort is not easily observed   3
or measured, and workers are confronted with a mix of different incentives. This makes 
interpretation of different effort levels difficult. An observed variation in wages may not 
reflect generosity but may be due to firm size, self-selection of workers, or simply 
productivity differences. Even if a relationship between wages and effort is detected, it may 
not necessarily reflect a fair-wage effort relationship; instead it could reflect strategic 
considerations based on reputation and repeated interactions. In the laboratory, these factors 
can be varied in a controlled fashion. The experimenter observes effort and wages and can 
rule out confounding effects such as multiple incentives, selection, productivity differences, 
or repeated interactions.  
The first experimental test of the existence of gift exchanges in the framework of a 
formal game-theoretic model was designed to mimic an employment relationship. 
Participants assumed the roles of workers and firms (5). Firms made (binding) wage offers, 
which workers could accept. If a worker accepted, he or she then had to choose a costly 
effort level. Labor contracts are generally incomplete contracts, i.e., effort is not fully 
contractually enforceable. In the experiment this is reflected by the fact that workers were 
free to choose any effort level above the contractually enforceable level. In this framework, it 
is possible to test the gift-exchange hypothesis against the self-interest assumption commonly 
made in economics that a self-interested worker would always choose the lowest possible 
effort, since effort is costly and there is no punishment for minimal effort. Anticipating this, 
the firm has no incentive to pay an above-minimum wage, because self-interested workers 
work no harder if given a higher than minimum wage. Nevertheless, the results of numerous 
gift-exchange experiments in the lab reveal that higher wages induce workers to provide 
higher effort levels. The experiment is a good example of the many experiments that have 
challenged the assumption of a universally selfish and rational homo economicus. Systematic 
lab evidence shows that people are boundedly rational, prone to behavior such as loss 
aversion, present-bias, or judgment biases (6). Phenomena such as reciprocity or social 
approval, which have been largely neglected by mainstream economics, have been shown to 
be important in affecting economic outcomes in bargaining and market interactions (7,8). 
These experiments illustrate that the lab offers possibilities to control decision 
environments in ways that are hard to duplicate using naturally occurring settings. In the 
laboratory, the experimenter knows and controls the material payoffs, the order in which the 
different parties can act, and the information they possess when they make choices and 
whether the game is repeated or one-shot. This control allows for the testing of precise 
predictions derived from game-theoretic models. Subjects are randomly assigned and 
decisions are rewarded. Payment ensures that subjects take their decisions seriously. For   4
example, if a firm pays a higher wage or a subject provides higher effort, costs are higher and 
final earnings are lower. In this sense behavior in the laboratory is reliable and “real”: 
subjects in the lab are human beings who perceive their behavior as relevant, experience real 
emotions, and take decisions with real economic consequences (6, 9-12). Lab experiments 
can be used for testing theories and to study institutions at relatively low cost (9). This is 
particularly interesting for policy questions where the proposed program intervention has no 
counterpart in reality, and where constructing the counterfactual states of interest may be 
done more easily in the lab than in the field. Moreover, while existing institutions are 
adopted endogenously, rendering causal inferences about their effects difficult, the lab allows 
exogenous changes in institutions. Lab experiments have turned out to be valuable in solving 
practical problems that arise in implementing matching markets (13), government regulation 
(14) or airport time slot allocation (15). “Economic engineering”, a combination of theory 
and experiments, has improved design and functioning of many markets (16).  
 
Lab or field is not the choice 
Resistance concerning laboratory evidence, often centers on an appeal to “realism”. This 
skepticism has recently manifested itself in a lively debate in economics about field versus 
lab experiments. While some scholars have argued passionately in favor of laboratory 
experiments where controlled manipulations of conditions on carefully documented 
populations are performed (17-19), others have argued in favor of field experiments where 
conditions are “more realistic” though perhaps less tightly controlled and where more realism 
also implies greater relevance to policy (3, 20-22). These controversies appear throughout the 
social sciences (3, 23-26).  
The casual reader may mistakenly interpret arguments about “realism” as an effective 
critique against the lab, potentially discouraging lab experimentation, and slowing down the 
production of knowledge in economics and other social sciences. The issue of “realism”, 
however, is not a distinctive feature of lab vs. field data. The real issue is determining the 
best way to isolate the causal effect of interest. To illustrate this point and to structure the 
debate about field and lab data, we suggest the following simple model. 
Consider an outcome of interest Y (e.g., effort supplied by a worker) and a list of 
determinants of Y, (X1,…, XN).  For specificity, suppose that 
  = … 1 (,, ) N Yf X X, (1) 
which is sometimes called an “all causes model” (27,28) because it captures all possible 
causes of Y in (X1,…,XN). The causal effect of X1 on Y is the effect of varying X1 holding   5
fixed  2 (, , ) N XX X =   … . In the pioneering field experiments (20), X1 was the tax rate on 
wages. In the laboratory gift-exchange experiment, the values of X1 are the different wage 
levels paid by firms. Unless f is separable in X1, so that  
  φ =+  
1 ()( ) , YX g X  (2) 
the level of Y response to X1 will depend on the level of X   . Even in the separable case, 
unless φ 1 () X is a linear function of X1, the causal effect of X1 depends on the level of X1 and 
the size of the variation of X1. These problems appear in both field and lab experiments, and 
in any estimation of the causal effect of X1.  
Among theX   in the gift exchange experiments described above are concrete details 
of market institutions such as the number of firms and workers, the order of moves, the 
choice set, payoff functions, information available, whether or not interactions are one-shot, 
and whether or not they are anonymous. More generally, X   could be demographic 
characteristics of the participants, the level of observation of actions by third parties, 
individual preference parameters (e.g., morality, persistence, self-control, social and peer 
influences) and other aspects of environments.  
Many laboratory experiments like the gift-exchange experiment have provided 
evidence of gift-exchange and social preferences in lab settings for certain values of    X , 
usually, but not always, using populations of undergraduates, and different bargaining and 
market institutions (7, 30). The relevance of these findings has been questioned in recent 
field experiments analyzing behavior in a population of sports card traders in a “natural 
setting”, i.e., for another set of conditions X′    including, e.g., different institutional details, 
payoffs, and a different participant population (29). In this particular market, the evidence for 
social preferences is weaker. If one is interested in the effect of social preferences under a 
third condition (X′′   ), neither the undergraduate nor the sports cards field study may identify 
the effect of interest. It is not obvious whether the lab X    or the field X′    is more informative 
for the third condition unless a more tightly specified economic model is postulated or a 
more precisely formulated policy problem is specified. Recent evidence suggests that 
empirical support for the existence of social preferences such as reciprocity or gift-exchange 
is not a matter of lab or field, but of the prevailing conditions such as the details of agent 
interactions  (31-33). When the exact question being addressed and the population being 
studied are mirrored in an experiment, the information from it can be clear and informative. 
Otherwise, to transport experimental findings to new populations or new environments 
requires a model (34).   6
Field methods are able to obtain a universally defined causal effect only if the special 
functional form (2) is specified and the response of Y to X1 is linear. If this is the case, 
however, lab experiments are equally able to obtain accurate inferences about universal 
effects. Observing behavior in the field is in general not more interesting or informative than 
observing behavior in the lab. The general quest for running experiments in the field to 
obtain more realistic data is therefore misguided. In fact, the key issue is what is the best way 
to isolate the effect of X1 holding constant  X   . No greater reality is conveyed by one set of 
X    than another unless the proposed use of an estimate, as well as target populations and 
settings are carefully specified. The pioneering field experiments (20) defined the target 
population and the questions sought to be answered very precisely. 
The usefulness of particular methods and data is ultimately a matter of the underlying 
research question. Lab experiments are very powerful whenever tight control of  X    is 
essential. This applies in particular for testing (game theoretic) models and behavioral 
assumptions. The lab can also easily implement many different values of X   , e.g., the 
number of buyers or sellers in market experiments, and in this way explore the issue of 
robustness of an estimated effect. Tight control of    X  also allows replicability of results, 
which is generally more difficult with field data. The field on the other hand offers a large 
range of variations in X   , which are potentially relevant but hard to implement in the lab. 
This way field experiments can provide important complementary insights to lab findings, 
e.g., in the area of development economics, or by addressing specific policy questions such 
as testing antipoverty programs that are targeted to, and need to be evaluated on, populations 




In addition to the “lack of realism” critique, other objections concerning lab evidence have 
been put forward. Ironically, most objections raise questions that can be very well analyzed 
with lab experiments, suggesting the wisdom of conducting more lab experiments, not fewer. 
One common objection is that lab experiments with students do not produce “representative” 
evidence. For the purpose of testing theories this is not a problem because most economic 
models derive predictions that are independent of assumptions concerning subject pools. On 
some aspects of behavior, however, students are not representative of the general population 
or a target population of interest and we would agree that a richer variation in context, 
populations and environments  X    should be used in future lab experiments. In this vein, the 
gift-exchange game has been run on non-student samples (35) yielding results similar to   7
those obtained using samples of students. Other studies have shown the relevance of social 
preferences for CEOs (36) for professional financial traders (37,38) or for the general 
population (39,40).  
It has also been noted that (i) stakes in experiments (money paid for decisions taken) 
are trivial, (ii) the number of subjects or observations is too small, (iii) subjects are 
inexperienced, (iv) Hawthorne effects may distort experiments, or (v) self-selection into 
experiments may bias results.  
(i) Most of what we know about the level of stakes on outcomes is derived from 
controlled lab experiments. The effects of varying stake size are mixed and seem to depend 
on concrete experimental contexts (41). Reciprocity does not vanish if subjects in the gift-
exchange experiment reported above are paid an equivalent of three months income (42). 
Even if stake effects are relevant, however, it is not obvious what the “right” level of stakes 
should be, that is, what are the right levels of X1 andX   ? We would ask in reply how often do 
people make decisions involving monthly incomes, and how representative would such high-
stake experiments be for the many decisions people make on a daily basis, which involve 
relatively small stakes? In any case, if one is seriously interested in how stakes affect 
behavior, one can run experiments with varying stake sizes.  
(ii) The issue of sample size is a red herring.  Effective methods have been developed 
for analyzing small sample experiments (43-45). Moreover, many experiments nowadays are 
run with samples of several hundred participants, sometimes with more than 1000 
participants (46).  
(iii) Experiments do not typically distinguish between experienced and inexperienced 
subjects. It is an empirically interesting question how experience, learning etc. affect 
behaviors. Failure to account for experience in some experiments is not an intrinsic weakness 
of the experimental method. In fact, it is common to run experiments with experienced 
subjects and to study learning effects. Good examples are a study on ratchet effects and 
incentives with Chinese managers (47) or a study comparing the behavior of workers and 
students (48). In a recent field experiment on gift-exchange, it was shown, for instance, that 
experienced donors, that is, donors who frequently donate for a particular charitable 
organization, reciprocally respond to gifts by donating more frequently (32). 
(iv) Another concern often raised is scrutiny, that is, the possibility that subjects in the 
lab behave differently because they perceive that they are observed. This is one version of a 
Hawthorne effect.  (Parenthetically, reanalysis of the original Hawthorne data shows that no 
Hawthorne effect was present in the Hawthorne study. See (49).) It is a minor problem in 
many experiments, especially if the decision environment is interactive and “rich”, such as in   8
sequential bargaining or market experiments. Moreover, being observed is not an exclusive 
feature of the laboratory: many decisions outside the lab are observed. Even on the Internet 
agents can be observed. In the lab, observers can be added to the experimental protocol. The 
lab allows the analyst to study the relevance of scrutiny by varying the degree of anonymity, 
e.g., contrasting video experiments where subjects are explicitly observed, with single 
anonymous (subject-subject anonymity) and double anonymous (full anonymity between 
subjects and experimenter) procedures (50-52). 
(v) Many scholars have expressed concerns about self-selection of particular 
participants into experiments. Self-selection is not necessarily a scourge.  It can be a source 
of information on agent preferences (27,28,34). In the lab, one can collect detailed data on 
the backgrounds and personality traits of participants to control for selection or to explicitly 
study selection in a controlled way (53,54). Selection is a feature of both field and social 
experiments (55) and is not a problem unique to lab experiments. Indeed problems of 




Experiments can be productive in complementing the information obtained from other 
empirical methods. One can combine lab and field experiments to better understand the 
mechanisms observed in the field. For example, this can be done by eliciting preferences and 
relating these preferences to observed behavior in the field (57-58). Another example of 
exploiting complementarities is the experimental validation of survey instruments (59). 
While surveys can generate large and representative data sets that provide statistical power, 
experiments allow the elicitation of preferences and attitudes in a controlled and incentive 
compatible way, as participants have to make choices with real money at stake. Such 
evidence is particularly important in securing better understanding of preference 
heterogeneity (60-63). The evidence that people are different clashes sharply with the widely 
used “representative agent” model that assumes that agents are homogenous or can be 
represented as if they are homogenous. Accounting for heterogeneity in preference 
parameters enables macroeconomists to calibrate economic models in an empirically founded 
way (61). 
We conclude by restating our argument. Causal knowledge requires controlled 
variation. In recent years, social scientists have hotly debated which form of controlled 
variation is most informative. This discussion is fruitful and will continue. In this context it is 
important to acknowledge that empirical methods and data sources are complements, not   9
substitutes. Field data, survey data, and experiments, both lab and field, as well as standard 
econometric methods can all improve the state of knowledge in the social sciences. There is 
no hierarchy among these methods and the issue of generalizability of results is universal to 
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